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ABSTRACT
This article combines two real world cases involving expensive, but highly unsuccessful
IT initiatives in small companies. One initiative used commercial software package; the other
used custom-built software. Both cases illustrate common mishaps that occur in smaller
companies whose employees and management have not paid much attention to the challenges
of building systems in organizations. Both cases leave the reader with questions about what
should be done next. Students using these cases benefit in the following ways:
Each of these brief cases provides enough details to see how project and life cycle
principles really do matter, and how lack of attention to these principles frequently leads to
disaster. Students comparing the two cases can identify for themselves a set of project principles
that might have led to better outcomes.
Each case provides a possibility of asking students to deal with a series of questions that
any business professional must deal with in defining an IT initiative and deciding whether it has a
high probability of success. These questions include:
•
•
•
•
•

What problem does the IT initiative address?
What work system has this problem?
Exactly what information will the information system create or use?
What is the relationship between the information system and the work system it
supports?
How would success be measured?
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Each case also provides an opportunity to look at prior student recommendations and
question whether they are justified by the facts or whether other recommendations might be
better.
KEYWORDS: system life cycle, system development case study, IT investment, system failure,
system implementation, system development in small firms
I. FOREWORD
This article combines and revises two brief real world cases produced by students in the
Professional MBA program at the University of San Francisco. Both cases involve expensive, but
highly unsuccessful IT initiatives in small companies. One initiative used a commercial software
package; the other used custom-built software. Both cases illustrate common mishaps that occur
in smaller companies whose employees and management have not paid much attention to the
challenges of building systems in organizations. Both cases leave the reader with questions
about what should be done next. A four-phase life cycle model summarized in the Appendix can
be used to help understand some of the problems that occurred.
These relatively brief cases can be used individually or in combination in conjunction with
introductory course material related to building and implementing information systems in
organizations. The cases were originally written in December, 2001 based on interviews, software
demonstrations, and documentation related to IT initiatives in two unrelated small companies.
The real companies encountered the system-related problems presented here, but they are not
named UpNow and Websters4, and contrary to the descriptions in the cases, their lines of
business are not directly related to the use of the Internet.
II. UPNOW SOFTWARE, INC.: ACQUIRING AND IMPLEMENTING CUSTOMER
RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT SOFTWARE
UpNow Software, Inc. is a privately held company founded in 1996 to sell an innovative
type of integrated software for building, operating, and monitoring e-commerce Web sites. Instead
of focusing on the software UpNow sells, this case focuses on activities in its sales department.
When UpNow started selling its products in 1997 the sales force consisted of the CEO and two
Vice Presidents. As its potential sales opportunities began to grow UpNow began to hire a
professional sales force. By the summer of 2000 UpNow had a direct sales force that consisted of
three Regional Vice Presidents, 20 sales representatives and three account development
representatives.
GETTING STARTED
Despite employing 20 sales representatives, in the summer of 2000, UpNow used
surprisingly informal methods to track sales opportunities, forecast sales, document relevant
information about clients, and monitor the progress of sales cycles. The account development
team’s primary responsibilities were prospecting for new sales opportunities and qualifying new
leads. When they qualified a lead, they would pass the information via e-mail to the designated
sales representative, who would continue to work with the prospect. The sales representatives
kept track of their own sales cycles. Once a quarter they entered data manually into spreadsheets
used to submit forecasted sales revenue and estimate dates for closing sales. Their sales
managers used this information plus conversations and email messages to monitor the status
and recent progress of potential sales and to produce estimates of total quarterly sales for all
sales people they managed.
This manual method seemed adequate when UpNow was small. Because there were
relatively few clients, most potential sales were discussed frequently by sales people and their
managers. As the company grew, it became clear that this process no longer worked. Sales
management needed visibility into the sales pipeline to forecast company revenues more
accurately and to determine which prospects had the highest priority and deserved an extra push
or additional resources. Furthermore, because details on leads and prospects were documented
only in a salesperson’s personal files, the departure of a sales or account development
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representative meant that knowledge and sales opportunities were simply lost. The sales force
as a whole needed to be able to share knowledge and information on accounts to minimize
repetitive effort and enable them quickly to identify customer needs and respond to opportunities.
UpNow’s management concluded that addressing these problems required a system that
would enable the sales representatives to consolidate prospective customer information in a
database and make it available to everyone who needed access to the information. In addition,
management wanted a system that formalized the tracking of leads throughout the sales cycle
and provided the ability to create accurate forecasts of future business.
Instead of creating the required software, UpNow’s management decided to purchase a
software package. It selected SellingWeb Software, which sold a web-based software product
named SellingWeb.
IMPLEMENTING THE SYSTEM
Although some customization of SellingWeb was required before it could be implemented
in the organization, no user input was gathered to guide the initial customization of the product.
SellingWeb was rolled out to the sales force in August 2000 shortly after it was selected.
Although the sales force received only a brief introduction and a short training session on how to
use SellingWeb, they were instructed to begin using the tool immediately.
Joseph Harkins, a member of the IS support staff at UpNow was assigned to be the
SellingWeb administrator after the initial roll out of the software, but was not involved from the
beginning of the project. Harkins did not know the SellingWeb product very well and was
unfamiliar with the business processes within the sales department.
After the software was rolled out, the sales team found the tool to be cumbersome and
believed it did not perform as well as management promised it would or as well as they wanted it
to perform. As a result, they did not use SellingWeb and went back to the old system of tracking
information manually on spreadsheets. The management at UpNow was unhappy with the initial
results, obtained feedback from the sales team, and went back to the vendor to request additional
changes and customization.
Unfortunately many of the changes in the software that attempted to fix a bug or improve
the software’s fit to UpNow’s sales processes resulted in problems elsewhere. Because no one at
UpNow or SellingWeb was responsible for mapping out the changes, a number of the changes
seem to have been made without thinking through the consequences in other parts of the system.
Even though UpNow’s CEO signed off and supported SellingWeb, the sales
management team showed little buy-in or commitment. The Senior VP of sales and his managers
did not see the value in using SellingWeb, believed it was extremely difficult to use, and argued
that it created extra work for sales people and took them away from creating new business. The
sales managers and representatives continued to employ the old system of using spreadsheets
to track sales information. Even when executive management threatened to eliminate
commissions if the sales organization did not begin to use SellingWeb, the sales managers
refused to use SellingWeb and continued to work as they had in the past.
UpNow already spent over $200,000 dollars on a software product that the entire sales
team refused to use because it was viewed as a negative change rather than a positive
improvement.
In January 2001 executive management at UpNow decided to make a second attempt to
fix the problems and roll out SellingWeb to the sales force. At this time, UpNow was in the
process of moving all of its computing to Windows 2000 and SellingWeb Software was coming
out with a new release. SellingWeb Software agreed to give UpNow a break on the price of
additional customization of SellingWeb if UpNow would agree to be a beta site for the new
release on Windows 2000.
SellingWeb consultants were brought in to redesign the user interface and to fix the
existing problems that made the software difficult to use. This time, user input from the sales
team was gathered in an attempt to make SellingWeb fit better with the existing business
processes and to make it easier to use. A new administrator from within UpNow replaced Joseph
Harkins, the previous internal administrator for SellingWeb. Executive management at UpNow
pushed their direct reports from sales management to agree to use the software. SellingWeb was
rolled out to the sales force a second time in April 2001.
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As the sales team and managers began using SellingWeb, it became apparent that no
policies or procedures were in place describing how the software should be used and how
information should be entered into the database. As a result, sales people entered information
inconsistently and used the same data fields for different purposes. In some instances, the same
account was entered up to five times in five different ways in several different places because no
formal procedures dictated how accounts should be defined and entered.
As a rotating group of SellingWeb consultants continued fixing bugs and improving the
interface, it also became apparent that no one was really in charge of what the consultants were
doing. Different consultants worked on the project from week to week, and a change created by
one consultant sometimes reversed a previous change by another consultant or caused a bug
somewhere else in the software. Soon problems emerged involving lost or missing data whose
disappearance no one could explain.
To complicate the situation further, changes and patches in the software went into effect
only when they were installed on the PCs the sales force used. Many of the remote sales
representatives did not get around to installing the patches on a timely basis. As a result, three or
four different versions of the software were soon being used simultaneously and circulating
among the sales representatives. This software inconsistency created confusion and further
resistance to using the SellingWeb.
These problems continued to undermine the sales team’s confidence in SellingWeb. In
light of these problems, the Senior VP of Sales continued to use his spreadsheet to track sales
volume and to do forecasting. To create the appearance of following the top management
mandate, he instructed his assistant to enter the information from his spreadsheet into
SellingWeb and run a report so it appeared as though the data was in SellingWeb all along.
By August 2001, UpNow spent another $50,000 and did not have software that was
working properly or business processes that actually used the software that was available.
UpNow had made some progress but still had a long way to go.
At this time, the CEO of UpNow demanded that the use of spreadsheets to track and
forecast sales be eliminated. The sales representatives, managers and VPs started using
SellingWeb to track sales and to run reports, but they did so reluctantly. However, some sales
managers still tried to work around the use of SellingWeb by not entering an account into
SellingWeb until they had worked with it for several months or more. The ability of upper
management to see how the sales people were progressing with their accounts was limited.
RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE STUDENT TEAM
Executive management at UpNow decided that UpNow needed to be more effective in
producing reliable sales forecasts and tracking sales throughout the sales cycle. Inadequacies in
these areas made it extremely difficult for the company to make plans for the future and to meet
its long-term goals. In an attempt to solve these problems, they decided to invest a lot of time and
money in a software product that they believed would solve the problem. In some ways they
seemed to view SellingWeb as the magic bullet that would automatically resolve all of their
problems with sales automation.
Despite spending over $250,000, UpNow is not yet able to accomplish this project’s goals
because it lacks a formal design and executed the implementation process poorly. To accomplish
the project’s goals UpNow needs to restart this project a third time. To succeed, it will have to
invest much more heavily in implementing the software in the organization and training the entire
sales staff about how to use the package and what is expected of them. A substantial
implementation effort will be required in order to attain the level of buy-in necessary for a success
project.
UpNow should implement the following recommendations:
1. Designate a manager for this project. This person would have two main roles.
• Project manager and primary point of contact with SellingWeb Software.
• A change agent who would be the advocate for SellingWeb throughout the
organization.
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This person would have to be well versed in the business processes affected by
SellingWeb and capable of interacting effectively with personnel from SellingWeb
Software.
2. UpNow should insist that SellingWeb Software also designate a project
manager who would oversee the UpNow project and manage all changes. Many different
consultants may do some of the work, but this individual within the software company
should be responsible as the vendor’s project manager and should track all changes to
ensure that no change interferes accidentally with a previous change. We recognize that
finding all interferences is a difficult task, but it must be done.
3. UpNow needs to conduct the formal, detailed requirements analysis that
should have been performed early in the project. This analysis will help define the
problems that UpNow is attempting to solve using SellingWeb. Conducting a formal
analysis will help ensure that the next roll out will address UpNow’s real requirements.
This analysis should include input from users, sales management, and IT. This analysis
was not done prior to the first rollout of SellingWeb because users were not involved. It
was not done effectively prior to the second rollout. Doing this analysis should lead to
agreement among the participants as to how work is done currently and how it should be
done in the future.
4. Business processes within the sales group and other processes that are
relevant to sales should be documented in detail from start to finish. This documentation
should include the way sales work is done now and the way it should be done using
SellingWeb. This analysis should define the process by which sales cycle data is entered
and what fields are used for what purpose. This documentation will help eliminate
inconsistency in data entry and problems with the same field being used for multiple
purposes. The only enhancements or changes to SellingWeb should be those that
support sales business processes. Care in this area should eliminate ad-hoc changes to
the software that solve one problem but cause another.
5. UpNow should conduct a third roll out with a small subset of users. That is, it
should do a pilot test with this subset. The firm should test the system thoroughly before
a final version is rolled out to the entire sales force. Once SellingWeb is thoroughly
tested, it should be presented to sales management to obtain buy-in and to prove that the
software is finally working. Once sales management makes a clear commitment, it should
be easier to encourage sales representatives to use it.
6. Once the software is operating properly and the pilot project is complete, the
entire sales team should be trained formally on SellingWeb, and on the business
processes that will use the software.
Note: Questions follow the Websters4 case.
III. WEBSTERS4, INC.: DEVELOPING A DATABASE AND ANALYTIC SOFTWARE FOR
ANALYZING WEB SITE USAGE
Websters4, Inc. is a company that provides data collection and analysis services related
to the use of e-commerce Web sites by potential and actual e-commerce customers. The
company was founded in 1996 by four entrepreneurs, but grew rapidly over the past few years,
hiring most of its 25 employees since 1998. In addition to providing software that monitors ecommerce Web sites and collects data needed to discern usage patterns and problems
encountered in using e-commerce Web sites, Websters4 also performs 50 to 60 analysis projects
per year supporting a variety of multi-national organizations and small clients from many
industries. In late 2001 Websters4 was still a young company with limited infrastructure and very
few formal processes and procedures in place.
When defining an engagement with a client, a Websters4 sales team works with clients to
identify important issues related to Web site usage and to determine what aspects of Web site
usage will be monitored by the Websters4 software. After a formal agreement is signed, the
Websters4 software is configured and often customized so that it can be used to monitor the Web
site for an agreed time span. At this point, clients may simply analyze the resulting data

The Perils of Ignoring “Systems 101”: Recovering from Mishaps at Two Small Companies by M. Garcia et al.

352

Communications of the Association for Information Systems (Volume 8, 2002) 347-359

themselves, or they may engage a Websters4 consulting team to create a series of reports based
on statistics collected by monitoring the Web site. These report include extensive spreadsheets
and graphs showing the numerical results segmented by various breakouts of customers and
other variables. For example, the breakouts by customer might include:
•
•
•

established customer vs. new customer,
big spender vs. little spender,
Web-savvy vs. apparently novice customer.

The consultants conduct a comprehensive analysis of the data, identify the Web site’s strengths
and opportunities for improvement, and develop recommendations to be presented to the client.
Client reports are typically produced for the entire Web site as well as subsets of the site, such as
the customer search process or the payment process. Larger projects may include over 50
reports.
Creating the graphs and spreadsheets in these reports became a challenging project
because it took too long to produce the graphs and spreadsheets and the potential for errors was
high. Webster4’s CEO and the VP of Analysis Services felt that the company's core strength was
usage analysis and development of recommendations. However, most of the staff's time was
being spent on manipulating the data, manual auditing, and quality control. In some instances it
took up to two days to produce a single spreadsheet from the data collected by the monitoring
software. Many steps of the report production process were completed manually or through
custom programming for individual clients, leading to potential errors in the data and the need for
extensive quality checking. Particularly problematic was the extraction, filtering, and aggregation
of usage data collected by customized applications designed around the peculiarities of client
Web sites. The time and effort required for creating reports became an obstacle that limited the
company's ability to work with large clients who want more complex analysis and expect a large
number of reports that look at the statistical results from many different viewpoints. The
excessive effort required to produce the reports also had a significant impact on staff morale and
job satisfaction because staff members had to spend much of their time on tedious data
consolidation and spreadsheet manipulation instead of analysis and formulation of
recommendations.
GETTING STARTED
Recognizing these issues and their impact on the company’s productivity and its
prospects for long term growth, Websters4’s top management decided to make a significant
investment in an information system that would store the Web usage data and would support the
production of graphs and spreadsheets for the reports. To do the information system project they
hired RJA Systems, a company with which they had an existing relationship. The original bid
from RJA estimated the highest project fees to be $93,500. Barry Felton of the Websters4
consulting team was assigned to lead the project and began working with the vendor to document
the company's requirements. Webster4’s senior leadership team and members of the consulting
team were only minimally involved. A draft outline of the requirements was created and the
vendor began programming.
From the outset the project was approached with little focus or structure. No feasibility
study was carried out. A lot of people within Websters4 were unhappy about the status quo, and
there was a general consensus of a need for a better way to convert Web usage data into graphs
and spreadsheets, but there was no careful discussion or clear documentation of the specific
changes that were necessary. The technical and organizational costs and impacts were not
discussed in depth.
BUILDING THE INFORMATION SYSTEM
After a number of months the vendor delivered the first version of the information
system. Around the time the first version appeared, Barry Felton, the only Websters4 employee
assigned to the project, left the company for another opportunity. The company’s IT manager
took over the process of testing the information system and communicating problems to the
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vendor. The users received approximately half a day of training and began using the information
system. The training was ineffective because several bugs were found which the vendor needed
to fix before the staff could use the information system at all. As the staff began using the
information system, it became apparent that the software contained numerous bugs and that
some of the required functionality was not yet programmed.
A new team consisting of the company's IT manager, manager of analysis services, and
VP of Operations was created to lead the effort to test the information system, further refine the
requirements and documentation, and communicate the needed changes to RJA Systems. An
ineffective cycle began in which the vendor would fix a few of the bugs and deliver a new version;
Websters4 employees would then find more bugs and inform the vendor. Neither the vendor nor
Websters4 used formal processes for documenting and communicating problems or testing new
versions. Halfway through this process, Websters4 management realized that the development
process was out of control. To create at least a minimal level of control, the IT manager extended
the Websters4 internal intranet to provide a location where users could record bugs and rate the
severity of the problems.
Shortly thereafter, RJA Systems found itself in dire financial straits and laid off the
majority of its staff, including the project manager for this project. At this point, customer service
and project management became even worse. Websters4 lost confidence in RJA due to the lack
of staff, poor customer service, and inability to understand their needs.
Websters4 terminated the relationship. The information system was incomplete and
unusable because the core functionality was not finished and because whatever functionality had
been produced was not completely debugged. The source code for the programs was available,
but training manuals and roll out presentations were extremely limited. The database and the
programs were undocumented. The total bill from RJA Systems was approximately $150,000,
which was $57,000 more than the highest estimate on the original proposal. The project was 18
months old, three times the original estimate of 6 months.
IN RETROSPECT
In retrospect, every phase of this project had serious flaws. During the project initiation, a
proper feasibility study should have been carried out to identify the problems with the existing
system. This feasibility study should also have stated the proposed scope and goals of the new
system, and should have summarized the economic, technical, and organizational feasibility and
impacts of a new system. Furthermore, no project plan was established to guide the development
of the new system. The vendor selection process was also questionable since Websters4 simply
used a vendor with whom it had an established relationship and assumed this company could do
the job. In addition, instead of establishing a core team, only one person was assigned to work
with the vendor, and senior management was uninvolved after the project began. A detailed
project plan should have been established before starting any of the development work. That plan
would have set start and completion times for various stages in the project, identified staffing
requirements, and charted a transition process from the existing system to the new system.
In retrospect, the following problems were encountered during the development phase,
1.
2.

3.

Neither external specifications nor internal specifications for the information system
were produced.
As a result of relying on limited and informal documentation, the vendor and
Websters4 staff did not have a shared understanding as to what was needed. A
direct consequence was that the information system lacked core functionality
needed by Websters4 to meet the system’s goal of producing reports more
efficiently.
A formal test plan was not created. Such a test plan should have existed and should
have identified how the new system would be tested, the data that would be used in
the testing, and the process involved in identifying and correcting errors. The lack of
awareness of the need for formal testing is one of the reasons why the company
began using the information system before testing was finished.
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4.

Most bugs were found in the process of using the information system instead of in a
testing environment, leading to delays and quality problems in work done for client
projects as well as frustration and loss of confidence in the new information system.

Just as there were no external or internal specifications to guide the programming effort,
there were no real plans to guide the implementation in the organization. Instead, implementation
began in a haphazard, unsystematic manner while the information system was still being
developed and before it had been debugged. Another problem was that there was only very
limited training and user documentation. The half-day of training and short user document was
not substantial enough to allow users to begin using the information system effectively. After 18
months and major expense and frustration, the system was not yet operational and could not
become operational until its functionality was complete.
RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE STUDENT TEAM
Based upon our analysis, we believe there are four primary options to resolve the issue
currently facing Websters4. Not fixing the information system is not really an option because of
the serious business implications of the status quo, such as loss of new business, limited growth
in the number of projects, size of clientele, and flexibility to meet current customer needs. The
realistic options are:
1.
2.
3.
4.

hiring a new staff member to complete the current information system,
hiring a new vendor to complete the current information system,
hiring a new vendor to outsource report production,
hiring a new vendor and starting over in creating a new information system.

Each of the four options has particular strengths and weaknesses. We used a weighted
score approach to evaluate the options systematically and to ensure we considered the most
important components of each. Through interviews with Websters4 senior leadership team we
determined that the most important criteria for evaluating alternatives include (listed in order of
importance):
•
•
•
•
•
•

cost to completion,
time to completion,
quality of work,
flexibility and ability to make changes to meet new demand,
annual maintenance cost, and
ease of training.

Using a weighting and ranking approach, we assigned a weighting between 0 and 3 to each of
the six criteria. For each of the four options we assigned a value between 0 and 10 to describe
the extent to which the option fulfilled the criterion. The numerical results are summarized in
Tables 1 and 2.
Based on the data in the Tables, we recommend completing the information system inhouse by hiring a staff person to complete the current information system. "Cost to completion"
and "time to completion" were the most important factors to Websters4 and scored highest and
second highest respectively in this option. The in-house option is estimated to cost $50,000 and
take 6 months to get the information system operating effectively in the company.
We do not anticipate significant difficulty finding someone with experience and the
required skills. All Websters4 employees have already been through some form of training on the
information system so additional training will not have to be as extensive as with a new
information system. In going forward with the in-house option, we recommend that Websters4
take the following specific steps during the project. Above all, the company should focus on
putting more structure and formal processes in place.
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Table 1: Applying Six Criteria to the Options for Websters4
Option I
In-house with current
database (hire a staff
person to fix the
database and
programs)
$50,000. Assumes the
new hire would cost
$10,400 per month
(including benefits)
and would work on the
project for 3 months.
(Also includes hiring
expense)

Option II
New vendor, current
system (find new
vendor to fix the
database and
programs)
Estimated at $115,000

Option III
New vendor who will
produce reports on an
outsourcing basis

Option IV
New vendor, new
system (start over from
scratch)

Total cost would be
$173,000 based on
initial bid from a newly
identified vendor.

$150,000 (this was the
total fee of the vendor
who programmed the
system)

Time to
completion

6 months
(2 months to hire, 1
month to review code
and work completed, 3
months to complete)

Moderate: Significant
concerns with the work
completed by old
vendor (due to high
volume of bugs)

5 months
(3 months to find
vendor, 2 months to
program our reporting
requirements, time
could be reduced by
moving forward with
vendor a recently
identified vendor)
High: Vendor would
have proven capability
of producing reports,
having already done
some initial work on
the database.

12+ months
(3 months to find
vendor, 9+ months to
review requirements,
design, document and
program, database)

Quality of
work

Flexibility
and ability to
make
changes to
meet new
needs

High: By having a staff
member do the work,
the only limitations
would be the staff
person’s capabilities
and time available for
this project.

6 months
(3 months to find
vendor, 1 month to
review code and work
completed, 2 months
to complete, assuming
vendor can assign
several programmers
to the project)
Moderate: Should be
confident that new
vendor can fix bugs
and will do good job,
but the structure of the
database would be
based on the first
vendor’s work
Moderate: Websters4
would have to hire the
vendor each time it
needed to change
something.

Annual
maintenance
cost
Ease of
Training

$41,000
(estimated)

$23,000
(estimated)

Moderate: Would be
using current database
that the Websters4
staff understands
based on partial
training to date.
Onsite person could
lead training and be
available to support
staff ongoing.

Moderate: Would be
using current database
that the Websters4
staff understands
based on partial
training to date.
Vendor would
complete training.

Criterion

Cost to
completion

Moderate: New
vendor is able to make
changes at any point,
but Websters4 would
have to pay flat rate
every time it wants
another report created
or a significant
modification.
$34,600
(estimated)
High: Minimal training
needed because
vendor would be
producing reports.

High: Websters4 has a
good idea of what it
wants and is better
able to outline
requirements for the
vendor.

Moderate: Websters4
would have to hire the
vendor every time it
needs something
changed after the new
system was installed.

$30,000
(estimated)
Low: New system, so
training would start all
over. Vendor could
provide training as part
of the project.
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Table 2: Comparing the Four Options Using Rankings and Weightings
Weight

Score
Opt 1 Opt 2 Opt 3
8
5
2

Opt 4
3

Opt 1
24

Weighted Score
Opt 2 Opt 3
Opt 4
15
6
9

Cost to completion

3

Time to completion

2.5

5

5

6

1

12.5

12.5

15

2.5

Quality of work

2

6

6

8

8

12

12

16

16

Flexibility to
changes

2

8

6

6

6

16

12

12

12

Annual Maintenance
Cost

2

4

7

5

6

8

14

10

12

Ease of Training

1

8

6

10

4

8

6

10

4

80.5

71.5

69

55.5

Total

In restarting the project, it is essential that Websters4 create a core project team. Even
though they will be bringing someone in-house to make the changes, there must be a team to
support these efforts. The purpose of the core team is to specify the scope and goal of the
project, make decisions during the development of the information system, and oversee
implementation in the company. The core team would also identify the specific skills lacking inhouse (e.g., programming skills) and conduct a thorough search for a person meeting the
requirements, potentially using a recruitment firm to ensure the person hired had the required
skills.
The core team should consist of one person from senior management, the IT manger, the
consulting manager, a project manager (an active user), and the new hire. Once the scope,
goals, costs, and time-to-completion are identified, the core team will complete a project plan. An
acceptance test plan and transition plan should also be started at this point.
The core team should create a clear project plan whose timeline specifies key
deliverables and milestones. The project plan should break the project into stages, each with start
and completion times. Additional software and hardware needs should also be identified. Most
important, the requirements documentation should be formal and reviewed thoroughly to ensure
clear understanding of the company's needs. A communication plan should be developed to
keep the company informed of progress, problems and issues. A test plan should be created to
identify errors and ensure that the system complies with the specifications.
A process should also be developed whereby changes, upgrades or corrections to the
system can be specified, prioritized, approved and implemented. The core team should also
periodically re-evaluate the system to determine if the system will continue to meet the needs of
the company in the next six months, or whether a redesign/replacement of the system is required.
Websters4 cannot afford to waste any more valuable time and resources on a project that does
not lead to a fully functioning information system. It is essential that the next attempt to fix the
reporting problem be successful. If Websters4 follows the specific steps recommended, we are
confident they will end up with an information system that meets their needs and that can be
implemented and maintained effectively.
IV. QUESTIONS
1. Clarify the situation in each of the two cases by deciding:
a. What problem does the IT initiative address?
b. What work system has this problem?
c. Exactly what information will the information system create or use?
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d. What is the relationship between the information system and the work system it
supports?
e. How would success be measured?
2. What are the main lessons from the Websters4 case? From the UpNow case?
3. Assume that each company could start its project from the beginning and could follow a welldefined process for acquiring and implementing its new information system. For each case
summarize what you think that process would be. Identify significant similarities and differences
between the desired processes for the two cases.
4. Take a very skeptical view and ask yourself whether there is enough evidence in either case
that the projects should be completed and not simply abandoned before more time and money is
spent. Identify plausible arguments (if there are any) in favor of abandoning the projects.
5. Review the student recommendations for each of the two cases and decide whether these
recommendations were based on enough information. If so, explain why. If not, explain what
additional information would be required before coming to a well-justified recommendation.
6. Assume that you have to make a recommendation without gathering any additional
information. Which student recommendations do you agree or disagree with, and why?
Editor’s Note: This article was received on March 7, 2002 and was published on April 12, 2002.

APPENDIX: PHASES IN A WORK SYSTEM’S LIFE CYCLE
From a business viewpoint, any system, regardless of whether or how it uses IT goes
through one or more iterations of four phases: 1
•
Initiation is the process of stating the problem and how a new IT-based system or
major upgrade of a previous system should help.
•
Development involves acquiring, building, and/or modifying the systems (IT and
non-IT) and other resources required to perform the required functions.
•
Implementation involves making the new system operational in the firm.
•
Operation and maintenance is the ongoing operation of the IT-based system and
the entire work system, plus activities related to solving problems solving as they
arise.
Each of these phases will be discussed in a bit more detail
Initiation. The initiation phase is the process of clarifying the reasons for changing the
work system, identifying the people and processes that will be affected, describing in general
terms what the changes will entail, and allocating the time and other resources necessary to
accomplish the change. This phase may occur in response to obvious problems, such as
unavailable or incorrect data. It may be part of a planning process searching for innovations even
if current systems pose no overt problems. When the work system involves software, errors and
omissions in this phase may result in software that seems to work on the computer but needs
expensive retrofitting after initial attempts at implementation in the organization. Unless the initial
investigation shows the project should be dropped, this phase concludes with a verbal or written
agreement about the proposed system’s general function and scope, plus a shared
understanding that it is economically justified and technically and organizationally feasible.
Depending on the situation this agreement might be general and informal, or might be quite
specific in identifying budgets, timelines, and measurable objectives. Key issues in this phase
1

th

Source: Alter, S Information Systems: Foundation of E-Business, 4 ed., Upper Saddle River, NJ;
Prentice-Hall, 2002. These phases are the basis of a revised life cycle model presented in Alter, S (2001)
“Which Life Cycle - Work System, Information System, or Project?” Communications of AIS, 7(17).
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include attaining agreement on the purpose and goals of the proposed change and making sure
that the likely benefits far exceed the likely costs in terms of time and resources. The larger the
project the more desirable it is to document specific expectations along with a plan for
accomplishing genuine results (as opposed to just performing specific activities at specific times).
Regardless of how formal the agreement is, the details of the desired changes will be worked out
in the development phase.
Development. The development phase is the process of defining, creating, or obtaining
the tools, documentation, procedures, facilities, and any other physical and informational
resources needed before the change can be implemented successfully in the organization. This
phase includes deciding how the work system will operate and specifying which parts of the work
will be computerized and which parts will be manual. In projects that involve new hardware, the
hardware must be acquired and installed. In projects that involve creating software, development
includes producing detailed specifications of what the users will see and how the software and
data operate on the computer. After the software programs and documentation are created and
debugged, the entire system of hardware and software is tested.
Completion of development does not mean “the system works.” Rather, it only means
that the tools, documentation, and procedures have been produced and that computerized parts
of the work system operate correctly on computers. Whether or not the computerized parts of the
work system actually work adequately will be determined later by how the entire work system
operates in the organization. Key issues in this phase revolve around creating or obtaining all
required resources in a cost-effective manner and, if necessary, demonstrating that tools and
procedures actually meet the requirements. Completion of this phase means that the tools seem
to function properly. Whether the work system will absorb or reject the desired changes is
determined by the next phase.
Implementation. The implementation phase is the process of making the desired
changes operational in the organization, which in the case of e-business might be a virtual
organization involving a number of different companies. Implementation activities include
planning, training of work system participants, conversion to the new work methods, and followup to ensure the entire work system operates as it should. Ideally, the bulk of the work in this
phase should occur after development is complete, meaning that all tools and procedures are
ready and that all software has been tested and operates correctly on the computer. This phase
ends when the updated work system operates effectively in the organization.
An initial step in this phase is detailed planning for the conversion from the old way of
doing things to the new. After work system participants are trained, the actual conversion to the
new work system occurs. This step usually raises issues about how to convert to a new process
with minimum pain and how to deal with political questions and changes in power relationships. In
all of this, success of the computerized parts of the work system is determined partially by
features and partially by the development and implementation process itself. The likelihood of
success drops if this process cannot overcome the inertia of current business processes or if the
implementation itself causes resistance.
If a work system’s development phase created or modified an information system, some
parts of the conversion involve the changeover to the new or modified information system and
other parts of the conversion may be changes in practices that are unrelated to the information
system. When the conversion affects data and methods used for transaction processing, it is
often necessary to perform the transaction work twice, once using the old work system and once
using the new work system in order to minimize the risk that the new work system will have
unforeseen problems that jeopardize or prevent its successful operation.
Operation and maintenance. This final phase involves keeping the work system
operating effectively by monitoring its performance and making minor changes that do not require
a major project. When an informa tion system plays a major role in a work system, someone must
make sure that it continues to operate, that it provides benefits, and that desired changes are at
least considered. This phase continues until the system is terminated or until major changes are
required. At that time a new iteration of the four phases starts; management allocates resources
to initiate a project; the new initiation phase ends with specific ideas about what should change;
the new development phase begins, and so on. Operation and maintenance may not seem as
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intellectually intriguing as development, but by typical estimates it absorbs the majority of a firm’s
information system expenses.
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